What’s Intellectual Property Good for? by Michele Boldrin & David K Levine
  1
What’s Intellectual Property Good for? 
Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine 
 
First version: November 8, 2010 




Intellectual property may turn out to be among a handful of themes that will 
accompany us for most of the XXI century, shaping our economic future and maybe 
not just that. In spite of having been around – with ups and downs – since the times 
of James Watt, the controversy over intellectual property started anew in the second 
half of the 1990s and is likely to grow, in both intensity and relevance, during the 
decades to come. Behind this renewal of interest we see three main reasons: (i) the 
emergence of a global economy in which, thanks to the mechanization of a growing 
number of physical production processes and the growth in average human capital, 
the role played by creativity and innovation in the production of value added 
increases at a fast rate; (ii) the increase in the level and the extension in the scope of 
intellectual property protection that started, in the USA, during the Reagan 
administration, continued worldwide with the establishment of the WIPO and shows 
no signs of relenting, yet; (iii) the emergence, after almost a century of apparently 
unanimous consensus within the legal and economic professions, of a dissenting and 
heterogeneous set of opinions questioning the legal foundations, the practical 
usefulness and the internal economic coherence of the existing system of intellectual 
property.  
Our contribution to this debate has been threefold. We pointed out, first, that 
the standard (so called “Schumpeterian”) theory of innovation is grossly at odds both 
with history and with statistical facts. In particular: we pointed out the absence of 
almost any example of innovative industry in which the “creative destruction” 
process takes place according to the predictions of that particular model.  Secondly, 
we brought to the forefront a point of view, rooted in classical economic theory, 
reconciling three main empirical findings: 
(i)  The existence of widespread and sustained innovation, over time and 
across sectors and countries, in the presence of imitation and 
competition, i.e. in the absence of any form of patents and 
copyright;  
(ii)  The lack of any convincing empirical evidence that monopoly, which 
intellectual property helps creating when and where it is adopted, 
has had the effect of increasing the rate of innovation by any 
measurable amount; 
(iii)  The existence of a small but important set of very costly innovations 
that are not undertaken under competition, requiring public 
subsidies to be carried out.   2
Third, we have contributed to a growing literature explaining not only why imitation 
and competition can go hand in hand but also, and more importantly, why reinforcing 
intellectual property often reduces innovation and only increases rent-seeking and 
wasteful transaction costs.  
Contrary to Paul David’s “humorous” remark, what we have done in our 
research on this issue is scarcely an example of “modern economics” (whatever that 
may be) theorizing something obvious after the fact. Rather, most of our research has 
meant to be a reminder - to the forgetful very many among contemporary economists 
- that established theories and models of innovative activity were, and are, orthogonal 
to the observed facts, and that a perfectly good theory explaining the evidence has 
been available since at least the times of Alfred Marshall. It only needed to be re-
evaluated and developed in the light of recent advances in economic theory. 
Interestingly enough, what we considered a rather straightforward contribution – i.e. 
facts contradict established theory but here is a piece of classical economic theory 
matching the facts quite well - has been received first with incredulity (i.e. “You must 
be wrong, there cannot be sustained innovation under competition”), then with a 
mixture of hostility and disdain of which we have two nice examples in Foray’s 
contribution to this volume and in the review by Scherer he quotes approvingly. But 
this controversial matter we should leave for the end. Between here and there, we first 
briefly summarize our theoretical viewpoint and then the main empirical evidence 
that, in our view, supports it. As we go along, we also try addressing some of the 
criticisms raised against our research since our book, Against Intellectual Monopoly, 
started to circulate about 3 years ago. 
 
2. What is all the fuss about? 
For all the opposing emotions and stern accusations the public debate over 
intellectual property is stirring, it seems both those in favor of strengthening and 
those in favor of weakening existing protection agree that intellectual property laws 
need to strike a balance between providing sufficient incentive for creation and the 
freedom to make use of existing ideas. Put it differently, both sides agree that 
intellectual property rights are a “necessary evil” that fosters innovation, and 
disagreement is over where the line should be drawn. For the supporters of intellectual 
property, current monopoly profits are barely enough; for its enemies currently 
monopoly profits are too high. In fact, one is tempted to say, for many “enemies” of 
intellectual property, profits are always too high as long as they are positive and for 
many “friends” of intellectual property, property are always barely enough, if they 
are enough at all. Among other things, we do not believe that trying to figure out if a 
very elaborate system of property rights - such as patents and copyright are - is or not 
socially useful by measuring if the profits it supposedly generates are or are not high 
enough ex-post, is the right way to go. Among the reasons why such a procedure is 
likely to produce inconsistent results, are the following ones: that profits, or lack of 
them thereof, in a line of business in which intellectual property is allowed may easily 
be due to factors other than intellectual property per se; that the “appropriate” level 
of profits, in any given line of business, is far from obvious most of the times; and 
that, last but not the least, the way in which a certain allocation of property right   3
may be socially damaging, or beneficial, has often very little to do with the measured 
level of profits one obtains in this or the other industry, if at all. In summary: better 
think at something else other than “profits” to figure out if intellectual property 
makes sense or not as a social arrangement. Our proposed candidate being the growth 
over time of consumer welfare or, which is roughly the same, the growth rate of labor 
and total factor productivity, sector by sector. Surprisingly enough, there is still 
exceedingly little research attempting to do this, i.e. trying to use sound models of 
innovation to evaluate empirically which relation exists between intellectual property 
and measurable economic growth. 
We should also make clear that the often heard statement according to which, 
in the absence of intellectual property protection, we would have to appeal to the 
benevolence of innovators, or to their desire to cooperate, to keep the stream of 
innovations flowing is just plain nonsense. When we advocate the abolition of patents 
and copyright we do not do so because we are of the view that innovators should work 
out of benevolence. Certainly few people do something in exchange for nothing. 
Creators of new goods are not different from producers of old ones: they want to be 
compensated for their effort. As far as we are concerned, innovators are like any other 
entrepreneur: they want to maximize profits from whatever business they are 
involved in, given the rules of the games and their capabilities. However, it is a long 
and dangerous jump from the assertion that innovators deserve and want 
compensation for their efforts to the conclusion that patents and copyrights, that is 
monopoly, are a good way of providing that reward. There are many other ways in 
which innovators may be and are rewarded, which are worthy of both theoretical and 
empirical investigation and are, instead, being neglected: competitive rents, first 
mover advantages, collateral sales, reputational effects, public prizes and subsidies, 
trading on the informative advantage the innovation provides and, finally, trading of 
the innovation itself. Hence, and again, since innovators may be rewarded even 
without patents and copyright, we should ask: is it true that intellectual property 
achieves the intended purpose of creating incentives for innovation and creation that 
offset its considerable harm?  
The same observation applies to those arguing that when some industry or 
trade is able to innovate even in the absence of formal intellectual property 
protection, this is due to special institutional arrangements that are not applicable in 
general. This statement is anti-historical, to start with: in the absence of intellectual 
property, which was extended to them only in recent years or decades, a very large 
number of innovative industries have been functioning very well for decades, 
centuries and even millennia. To name the most visible ones: agricultural innovations 
have been patentable, de facto, only since the 1970s, while, until the end of WWII, the 
development of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries has taken place 
essentially without patentability for its products. The software industry, arguably the 
most innovative during the last half century, developed also in the complete absence 
(according to many practitioners, including Bill Gates, “thanks” to the complete 
absence) of any form of intellectual property, which was extended to it, progressively, 
only during the last two decades. The empirical evidence available shows that, in all 
these industries, the rate of technological innovation has certainly not increased – and   4
it may well have decreased – since patents were allowed. The financial industry is, for 
any practical matter, still free from copyright and patents while, in spite of its many 
and even dramatic regulatory failures, it keeps innovating at a remarkable speed. The 
list can be substantially extended. On the side of copyright the same is true, for 
example, for classical music until about the second half of the XIX century and the 
US book publishing business until the end of the same century. Claiming that special 
circumstances explain the open source or the fashion industries of the XX and XXI 
centuries, amounts to ignoring the best available historical evidence while revealing to 
be unable to explain the facts. The “exceptionality argument” is also theoretically 
confused insofar as it fails to recognize that various among the mechanisms described 
as “special” are, in fact, quite general and applicable to plentiful trades. As this point 
requires a bit of additional elaboration we will return to it when discussing the open 
source software experience in section 5.  
Begin by asking: why should creators have the right to control how purchasers 
make use of an idea or of a new good? This gives creators a monopoly over the idea. 
We refer to this right as “intellectual monopoly,” to emphasize that it is this 
monopoly over all copies of an idea that is controversial, not the right to buy and sell 
copies. The government does not ordinarily enforce monopolies for producers of other 
goods. This is because it is widely recognized that monopoly creates many social costs. 
Intellectual monopoly is no different in this respect. The question we address is 
whether it also creates social benefits commensurate with these social costs. 
This may be the appropriate point to discuss another, often heard, criticism, 
according to which “monopolistic competition” is the rule of the game in almost every 
industry, hence what difference does a patent or a copyright make? It makes a big 
difference: in the market for shoes or bread competing firms freely select where to 
position themselves. If one likes to position very close or very far from its 
competitors, there is no legal constraint to prevent such a choice from being 
implemented. When patents and copyrights enter the scene the situation changes: one 
can no longer choose freely how to compete with the insiders. The world of free 
monopolistic competition is an always changing one in which your competitors may 
come extremely, even unpleasantly, close to you and beat you, for example, just 
because they use a cheaper delivery system. In the world of legal monopoly this is 
prohibited by law, for two decades in the case of patents and for pretty much ever in 
the case of copyrights. Thereby the qualitative difference. Is it also quantitatively 
important? We believe it is and the data we have brought to bear on the issue, suggest 
so. We may have made the wrong calculations and we may have looked at the wrong 
facts, but we need to be proved wrong with facts and data. Just arguing that “cosi’ 
fan tutte” is not enough.  
A number of critics have argued that our use of the term “monopoly” to define 
the effect that intellectual property has on the markets where it applies, is too strong 
when applied to copyright because the latter seeks to protect “expression” of ideas, 
not the idea being expressed. Maybe it is too strong, but, in the English vocabulary, 
we cannot find a better term describing a legal right that allows sellers of, say, books 
to determine what lawful buyers of their product are allowed to do with it. In 
particular, how else to define the following facts? Publishers of academic journals can   5
prevent the original authors of the articles from circulating copies of the same, even 
for free. Citations from books, or music, or movies that were legally purchased cannot 
be longer than a few lines or seconds without additional payments to the original 
publisher, even if such citations are obtained through legal and widely available 
technologies.  As a third example consider the recent Google Book disaster  - born as 
Google Print, then morphed into Google Books Search - in which publishers of books 
that had been legally purchased, at library rates, by libraries around the world have 
successfully challenged the right of such libraries to enter into cooperation with 
Google in order to digitize those books and make them searchable and usable on line, 
for free, through Google’s proprietary technology. Matter of fact a “monopoly” is, in 
economic parlance, the exclusive right to sell/produce a certain object of service.  
A further point of discussion is that proposals to either abolish or greatly 
reduce intellectual property would be infringing on long established rights that are 
protected, among other, by constitutional provisions. The U.S. Constitution allows 
Congress “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”1 Our perspective on patents and copyright is a similar one: from a social 
point of view, and in the view of the founding fathers, the purpose of patents and 
copyrights is not to enrich the few at the expense of the many but only to promote 
innovation and creativity. Nobody doubts that J. K. Rowling and Bill Gates have 
been greatly enriched by their intellectual property – nor is it surprising that they 
would argue in favor of it. But common sense and the U.S. Constitution say that 
these rights must be justified by bringing benefits to all of us, which gets us back, 
once again, to the issue of evidence we obsessively stress: where is it?  
This is a point that deserves stressing: in the current debate one is repeatedly 
forced to face the claim that, should intellectual property be reduced or abolished, the 
income of innovators would be reduced, sometime substantially. The latter 
observation is then used to imply, automatically, that this would bring about an end 
to innovative activity. This is an absolute non sequitur as it ignores that what 
matters is the absolute value of the rent accruing to the innovator compared, on the 
one hand, with the fixed cost of the innovation and, on the other, with the rent that 
would accrue to him in his alternative forms of employment. In other words: what 
matters is the opportunity cost of innovators and not how large a share of the social 
value of their innovations they take home, a theme continuously, and erroneously, 
stressed in the industrial organization literature. To clarify this, apparently forgotten, 
point let us turn to a bit of economic theory. 
3. Does Intellectual Monopoly Increase Innovation? Theory 
From a theoretical point of view, intellectual monopoly may both increase and 
decrease innovation: it provides more revenues to those that innovate, but also makes 
innovation more costly. Innovations generally build on existing innovations. While 
                                                 
1 U.S. Constitution Article 1, Section 8. The U.S. Constitution, not being copyrighted, is online at various 
places, such as http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution. 
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each individual innovator may earn more if he has an intellectual monopoly, he also 
faces a higher cost: he must pay off all those other monopolists owning rights to 
existing innovations. In other words: as a matter of theory in a general equilibrium 
where monopoly is the rule, while it is unambiguous that consumer surplus will be 
greatly reduced relative to one where competition is the rule, it is not obvious at all 
that there would be a higher aggregate level of innovative activity. In fact, we have 
used simple and natural models to show that, in the limit, such a world converges to a 
Nash equilibrium where innovation has probability zero, (Boldrin and Levine 
[2005a]).  
Again and along the same lines: from a theoretical point of view, once the 
monopoly power is taken away innovator’s rents will decrease as competitors move in 
and productive capacity expands much faster than under monopoly, as one would 
expect in a competitive industry. Still, as Marshall (but even Smith and Ricardo 
before him) taught us, rents due to the existence of limited capacity will be dissipated 
slowly as entry, imitation and competition take place over time and not 
instantaneously and without cost. Plentiful static theories of innovation, adopted in 
the industrial organization literature, abuse of the competitive equality of prices and 
marginal costs by ignoring that it is reached, under free entry, only in the long run 
equilibrium of the industry. There is no theoretical reason to believe that the time-
integral of rents accruing to innovators along the path to such long-run position could 
not cover their opportunity costs, hence motivating them to go ahead with the 
innovation in any case. Again, the matter is empirical and it can be addressed only by 
looking at different industries and the rate at which innovation increases or decreases, 
when monopoly power and concentration increases or decreases. This point has been 
made repeatedly and, again and again, it has been ignored by the followers of the 
“Schumpeterian” model. They seem unable to comprehend that the theoretical tool 
they adopt is just an extremely special case of the “Marshallian” one; a special case 
that obtains when productive capacity can be accumulated instantaneously and at 
zero cost to anyone else but the innovator.  
A very special “special case” indeed it is, as can be easily grasped with a bit of 
reflection. In the baseline model of innovation adopted by most new growth and 
industrial organization theorists, in fact, absent intellectual property the competitive 
equilibrium would be one of pricing at (variable) marginal cost, implying equilibrium 
losses equal to the fixed costs. This prediction evaporates as soon as one is willing to 
admit that even imitators would have to pay some fixed cost of entry, for very small –
say f - that the latter could be compared to that – say F   f - of the innovator. It is 
trivial to see that, in the latter case, the payoff to the imitators when goods are sold at 
marginal cost is –f, making the choice of entering the industry dominated by that of 
staying out and doing nothing, as the latter yields a payoff of 0 > -f. Under such 
assumptions, in fact, the only sub-game perfect equilibrium of the sequential game in 
which the innovator first chooses to either innovate or not and then the imitator 
chooses to either imitate or not, is one in which the innovator innovates while the 
imitator stays out, thereby leaving the innovator with full monopoly profits even in 
the absence of any intellectual property protection! This equilibrium is still there even   7
in the limit case in which f→0 while F remains positive. Only, in this case, the 
sequential game in question has a second sub-game perfect equilibrium in which, just 
out of spitefulness, the imitators enter the industry purely to force the innovator into 
making losses of –F, as their payoff of zero is identical to what they would receive by 
staying out. In other words, as a matter of theory, the so-called “Schumpeterian” 
theorizing about innovation and growth seems to rely more on individual spitefulness 
than anything else.  
Let us move on to consider other theoretical aspects of the matter. Expecting 
strong competition from imitative firms a potential innovator would have lower 
incentives to innovate if the industry in which it operates were such that the other 
firms do not have the ability to innovate by themselves. In other words, if our 
putative innovator were, for whatever reason, the undisturbed leader of the industry 
under consideration and the other players could always and only choose between 
imitating and doing nothing, then it would be reasonable to innovate as little as 
possible to keep the leadership, as the competitors are capable of competing only by 
imitating and catching up. As a matter of theory, but also as a matter of common 
sense, things can easily be different, i.e. in a competitive industry there may be more 
than one firm capable of innovating at any given point in time and competitor can, 
suddenly, jump ahead of a passive and non-innovative leader, leaving it in the dust. 
To the extent that we are not living in a world of “once-and-for-ever” innovations, 
and to the extent in which, in any given industry, there is no designated forever 
leader, the faster dissipation of the innovator’s rents together with the higher risk of 
losing the leadership because other firms may innovate, would provide an incentive to 
try keeping the lead by innovating faster. Again, which of the two outcomes is more 
likely in reality is a matter of empirical evaluation, little of which seems to interest 
applied industrial organization researchers.  
There are other dimensions along which theory per se is unable to provide an 
answer but into which the theoretical contributions of the last two decades have 
shown it worth focusing our empirical attention. A number of economic historians, 
Douglass North and his followers foremost among them, have argued that the great 
acceleration in innovation and productivity we associate with the Industrial 
Revolution was caused by the development of ways to protect the right of inventors, 
allowing them to profit from their innovations.2 Central among such ways was the 
attribution of patents to inventors, and their upholding either by Parliament or by 
the courts. Relative to the very poorly defined contractual rights of pre-seventeen 
century Europe, plagued by royal and aristocratic abuses of property and contracts, 
there is no doubt that allowing entrepreneurs a well defined, if temporary, monopoly 
over the fruits of their inventive effort was a major step forward. Even monopolistic 
                                                 
2 To learn more about Douglass North’s views one may want to start from North [1981, 1991]. It should be 
noted that North does not subscribe to a naïve view of the evolution of property rights according to which 
they become progressively more “efficient” or just simply “better” as time goes on and the economy 
develops. Being aware of the fact they are, more often than not, determined by rent-seeking agents within a 
political game, North is careful at pointing out that the system of property rights one often faces is 
substantially inefficient or inefficiency-inducing along more than one dimension. 
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property is much better than a system that allows arbitrary seizure by the rich and 
powerful. This does not, however, contradict the claim according to which widespread 
and ever growing monopolistic rights are not as socially beneficial as well defined 
competitive property rights. To put it differently, about four centuries ago, as 
Western societies moved away from post-medieval absolutist regimes, the 
establishment of patents constituted a step forward for the creation of a system of 
property rights that favored entrepreneurship and free market interaction. By the 
force of the same reasoning, the abolition of patents and of the distortionary 
monopolistic rights they entail may well result, now, in an analogous boost to 
entrepreneurial effort and technological change. Once again, as a matter of available 
theories one cannot safely conclude one way or another. Only careful historical and 
institutional analyses of as many case studies as possible, of which those this volume 
contains are excellent examples, will allow us to provide, eventually, an answer to this 
question. Point is, though, that without the theoretical contributions published since 
the middle 1990s, which have allowed us to question the established consensus, this 
kind of questions could not even be asked. 
The contribution that the Neo-Institutional approach may still provide to this 
debate raises a number of relevant issues we unfortunately cannot address here. We 
would like, though, to point out one thing: patents are by no means the only legal 
instruments allowing for contractability of ideas and for the creation of a maket for 
technology transfers. Beginning with the pathebreaking work of Jack Hirshleifer in 
the early 1970s, it has become clear that economically valuable information can be 
traded in the absence of patents and under condition of competition or nearly so. 
There is no prima facie evidence, either theoretical or empirical, for the claim that the 
disappearance of patents would increase transaction costs associated to technology 
transfer. Most likely, it will reduce them insofar as it will reduce incentives for rent-
seeking, defensive patenting, submarine patenting and all the gigantic legal costs 
these practices have brought upon us. In summary, well defined and protected private 
property of own ideas does not require monopoly over them pretty much in the same 
way that private property of our own cars does not require the two of us becoming the 
only motorized citizens of the USA. 
Theory, finally, suggests also that small countries with low IP protection 
should witness a surge in the inflow of IP-related investment after their IP protection 
is increased, as they capture investments from other countries where intellectual 
monopoly is protected less. The latter is a particular kind of “zero-sum game”3 that, 
unfortunately, appears to have gone beyond a mere theoretical possibility. What is 
less obvious, is what the outcome will be once every country adopts the same high 
degree of IP protection. Leave aside the more or less terrifying scenarios of escalation 
– in which countries out-do each other trying to allure IP-related investments by 
progressively increasing their local protection of intellectual monopoly. It is still 
worth asking if a world where everyone has the same degree of IP protection as, say, 
the US currently does is a world with a higher or lower rate of innovation and a higher 
or lower social welfare than a world with much less IP protection. 
                                                 
3 In fact, negative-sum insofar as it increases lobbying efforts and related wasteful transaction costs.   9
4. Does Intellectual Monopoly Increase Innovation? Facts 
Theory gives ambiguous answers to most of the important questions we ask, so 
let us look at evidence, supported by a bit of statistical common sense. Recognize, 
first, that intellectual monopoly is a double-edged sword. The existence of monopolies 
increases the cost of creation. Because this is a fact regularly ignored in the public 
debate let us try again to bring it to the forefront with a brief list of examples: 
  Boulton and Watt’s steam engine patent most likely delayed the industrial 
revolution by a couple of decades. 
  Selten’s automobile patent set back automobile innovation in the United States 
by roughly the same amount of time. 
  The Wright Brothers airplane patent forced innovative work on airplane 
technology out of the United States to France for a decade or so. 
  The patent system of England and France forced the chemical industry to move to 
Germany and Switzerland, where chemical patents did not exist or were much 
weaker. 
  When Verdi gained copyright over his works he stopped producing new works. 
More generally, there is no evidence that the adoption of copyrights stimulated 
the creation of classical music.  
  As various have documented, the explosion of patents that followed the 
patentability of software code has most likely contributed to slow down the rate of 
innovation in this industry.  
 
Given the continued extension of patent protection to new areas – business 
practices and computer software, for example – one might hope to find very strong 
evidence, in recent data, that the introduction of patent protection has lead to a 
substantial increase in innovation. These hopes, alas, are not to be fulfilled: it is 
already apparent that the recent explosion of patents in the U.S., the E.U. and 
Japan, has not brought about anything comparable in terms of useful innovations 
and aggregate productivity. This we asserted a few years ago, while working on our 
book, and it is even more readily apparent today, in the midst of the Great Recession. 
The patents’ explosion that started in the late 1980s did not bring about any 
sustained increase of the aggregate productivity growth rate of the USA, the EU or of 
Japan. In fact, as far as standard aggregate measures of productivity are concerned 
(i.e. labor and total factor productivity) they have been doing worse recently, on 
average, than during most previous decades. Furthermore, if one looks carefully into 
the data, one notices that the sectors that most have contributed to the growth in the 
aggregate productivity of advanced economies during the 1980s-2010 period - i.e. 
retail and distribution, finance, insurance and real estate, constructions, information 
technology – were characterized by a very low rate of effective intellectual property 
protection, relative to the rest of the economy, when the bulk of their innovative 
contribution took place. The aggregate evidence, in other words, does not support the 
claim that strengthening, as we dramatically have, the level of patent protection will 
lead to substantial improvements in our growth rate. To this fact we should add that, 
while there is no hope of finding evidence supporting the claim “more patents =   10
higher productivity” in recent aggregate data, also the historical evidence provides 
little or no support to this claim.4 Let’s therefore move on to summarize briefly what 
we have learned from more disaggregated industrial or case studies of the last few 
decades.  
 
4.1 Patents and Innovation in the 20th Century 
A number of studies have attempted to examine whether introducing or 
strengthening patent protection leads to greater innovation using data from post 
WWII advanced economies. We have identified twenty three economic studies that 
have examined this issue empirically.5 The executive summary: they find weak or no 
evidence that strengthening patent regimes increases innovation; they find strong 
evidence that strengthening the patent regime increases … patenting! They also find 
evidence that, in countries with initially weak IP regimes, strengthening IP increases 
the flow of foreign investment in sectors where patents are frequently used.  
The authors who find the strongest effect on innovation of increased patent 
protection are Kanwar and Evenson, and Lo. The latter examines the 1986 reform in 
Taiwan, while the former use time series data from a cross section of countries to 
regress R&D as a fraction of GDP on various variables including a qualitative 
measure of IP protection. Both sets of results are worth examining a bit more closely 
than the rest. 
Lo finds increased innovation by Taiwanese inventors as measured by R&D 
expenditure and by the number of U.S. patents they were awarded. However, given 
the worldwide surge in U.S. patents about this time and the fact that the number of 
Taiwanese patents awarded to these same inventors did not much increase, we can 
neither reliably conclude that the effect of the 1986 law was an increase in innovation, 
nor a jump in aggregate or sectorial productivity. What the reform certainly did, and 
Lo documents this convincingly, was to increase the number of patents awarded to 
Taiwanese firms, especially in the U.S., which is altogether not surprising. Lo himself 
points out that the main channel through which the Taiwanese reform had a positive 
effect was by fostering foreign direct investment in Taiwan especially in those sectors 
in which patents are widely used.  
                                                 
4 Apart for the substantial amount of historical evidence surveyed in our book and based on dozens of 
independent studies, the reader interested in learning more has got a plenty of good books available. A few 
titles to start from are Epstein and Maarten [2005, eds.], Khan [2005, Chapter 2], Landes [1969] and 
Landes [1998]. A recent and fairly unbiased synthesis of the historical literature concerned with the impact 
of patents on the Industrial Revolution and inventive activity during the 18
th and 19
th century, McLeod and 
Nuvolari [2006], concludes by saying “However, it would be wrong to assume that the emergence of patent 
systems played a critical or determinant role in such a transition. The evidence discussed in this paper has 
shown that the institutional arrangements supporting inventive activities in this historical phase were 
extremely variegated and sophisticated. […] In other words, the roots of western industrialization seem to 
have been wider and deeper than the emergence of modern patent systems.” 
5 For a detailed analysis of these empirical studies we must refer the reader to our book. The data about 
patents mentioned below come from the 2003 Annual Report of the USPTO, which can be found on line at 
//www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual, additional basic data is from www.cms.hhs.gov. 
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This is an important point, which deserves a separate comment as we already 
mentioned at the end of section 3. In a world in which strong patent protection in 
some countries co-exists with weak protection in others, a country that increases 
patent protection should observe an increase in the inflow of foreign investment, 
especially in those sectors where patented technologies are used. Profit maximizing 
entrepreneurs always choose to operate in those legal environments where their rights 
are the strongest. In the U.S., for example, economists and people with common sense 
alike, have long argued that the policy of offering tax incentives and subsidies to 
companies that relocate in one state or another is not a good policy for the United 
States as a whole. Nobody denies that, if you provide a company with high enough 
subsidies and tax incentives, it will probably take them and relocate to your state, at 
least temporarily. The problem is that, after you do so, other states will respond by 
doing the same, or more. In the ensuing equilibrium, the total amount of investment 
is roughly the same as when no one was offering a subsidy, but everyone is now 
paying a distorting tax to finance the subsidy. When capital moves freely across 
countries, the very same logic applies to the international determination of IP rights. 
In what economists call the Nash Equilibrium of this game, it is obvious that patent 
holders prefer to locate in countries with strong IP laws. This increases the stock of 
capital in the receiving country and reduces it everywhere else, especially in countries 
with low IP protection. Hence, absent international cooperation, the strong incentive 
of most countries to keep increasing patent protection, even in the absence of 
lobbying and bribing by intellectual monopolists.  
As for the study by Kanwar and Evanson, they have data on 31 countries for 
the period 1981-1990. Using two 5 year averages they find support for the idea that 
higher protection leads to higher R&D as a fraction of GDP. Their measures of IP 
protection do not always seem to make sense, but this is not the proper place to 
engage in a statistical debate. There are five levels of IP protection and R&D as a 
fraction of GDP ranges from a ten year average of .231% in Jordan to 2.822% in 
Sweden. They find that increasing IP by one level raises R&D as a fraction of GDP 
between 0.6% to 1.0%. As before, the most favorable interpretation of this result is 
that countries offering higher levels of IP protection also attract investments in those 
sectors in which R&D and patents are most relevant. A less favorable interpretation 
of this result, instead, points out that Kanwar and Evenson have forgotten to include 
a main determinant of the ratio of R&D to GDP: that is, market size as measured by 
GDP. The most elementary theory of innovation, either under competition or under 
monopoly, shows that the innovative effort is increasing in the size of the market, and 
that large and rich countries will invest a larger share of their GDP in R&D compared 
with small and poor countries. Putting Kanwar and Evanson’s data together with 
GDP data from the 1990 CIA World Fact Book, we find that a 1% increase in the size 
of a country as measured by GDP increases the ratio of R&D to GDP by 0.34%.  
It is interesting to looks at the residual error that is left over after we predict 
the ratio of (the logarithm of) R&D to GDP from (the logarithm of) GDP. Sorted by 
IP level we find 
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IP Level  Average 
Residual 
0  -0.95 
1  -0.46 
2  0.20 
3  0.20 
4  0.10 
 
What does this show? The question is whether increasing the IP level leads to 
an increase in the residual. Moving from level 0 to 1 and from level 1 to level 2 this is 
true, but not moving from 2 to 3 or 3 to 4. In other words, once you control for 
market size, higher IP protection increases the R&D/GDP ratio at the very low levels, 
but becomes uncorrelated with the R&D/GDP ratio at any level of IP protection 
equal to 2 or more in the Kanwar and Evenson scale. This reinforces the idea that 
what we are seeing is primarily the effect of foreign investment. Among poor countries 
with low IP protection, increases bring in more foreign investment and raise R&D. In 
richer countries with high levels of IP, foreign investment is not an issue, and 
increases in IP have little or no effect on innovation. 
All the empirical studies we considered in our book were either published or 
completed before the year 2006, hence one may reasonably suspect that more recent 
evidence could show different, even opposite, results. Indeed, if institutional changes, 
such as the strengthening of patent’s laws, are slow to implement and even slower to 
make their effects felt, it is not unreasonable to expect that statistically measurable 
beneficial effects of intellectual property reforms would have to wait for a decade or so 
to be seen.  It is therefore relevant to point out that the Paper and Proceedings of the 
American Economic Association published, in 2009, a group of papers contributed 
during the annual meetings of the latter that had, as their central piece, the summary 
of a vast empirical work by Josh Lerner (Lerner [2009]) documenting the negligible, 
possibly negative, impact of strengthening patent protection on innovative activity. 
Let us quote directly from the conclusions of the extended working paper version of 
the same article 
“This paper examined the impact of changes in patent policy on innovation. Rather 
than analyzing a single case, I studied 177 of the most significant shifts in patent policy 
across sixty countries and 150 years. Adjusting for the change in overall patenting, the 
impact of patent protection-enhancing shifts on applications by residents was actually 
negative, whether filings in Great Britain or domestically were considered.  
The lack of a positive impact of strengthening of patent protection on innovation is a 
puzzling result. Not only does it run against our intuition as economists that incentives affect 
behavior, but also runs counter to the findings in the “law and finance” literature that 
stronger property rights (e.g., those giving equity-holders more prerogatives) encourage 
economic growth.”     13
For the time being, we rest our empirical case here. Should additional, better 
and more convincing empirical research be made available that proves the opposite is 
true, we are ready to change our minds.6  
5. Abolition 
Defenders of intellectual monopoly like to portray our position as careless and 
somewhat silly or, at least, naïve. This is, after all, a simple but somewhat cheap way 
to avoid having to debate the intellectual substance of what we claim. At the same 
time, defenders of intellectual property like to portray the latter as a powerful and 
beneficial medicine for an unavoidable and dangerous disease: the highly hypothetical 
“market failure” according to which there would be none, or little, innovation absent 
intellectual property. We call the alleged market failure “highly hypothetical” 
because, as we have briefly illustrated in sections 3 and 4, the theoretical model 
implying such failure is a shaky special case of the general competitive model for 
which such failure is far from obvious and, more importantly, because there is 
practically zero evidence of such widespread failure taking place in practice. While we 
keep waiting for substantive arguments showing why we are wrong along the two 
dimensions just mentioned, let us consider some of the critical shots aimed at our 
arguments. 
Why do we preach abolition of intellectual property instead of advocating this 
or that reform, this or that improvement? We already showed the logical flaws in the 
theoretical diagnosis supporting the prescription: the underlying economic theory 
predicts that we should observe monopolies everywhere, even in the absence of 
intellectual property. Because we clearly do not, it is reasonable to wonder how well 
grounded the underpinning hypotheses are. A vast literature, which we have not 
mentioned here but is surveyed in our book, documents that the medicine of 
intellectual property has serious side effects and other scientific studies have found at 
best weak evidence of temporary benefits. Further, all available studies show that in 
those circumstances in which the patient was not taking the medicine, there was no 
evidence of the illness coming back. Given all this evidence, would you employ such a 
drug on an otherwise healthy patient? Perhaps not, unless the illness was clearly 
visible and proved to be life threatening. Under such circumstances, is it really so 
naïve and illogical to claim that, maybe, taking the patient off this dangerously 
addictive drug may be an option worthy of consideration? These are the reasons why 
we claim that, “on the basis of the present knowledge”, progressively but effectively 
abolishing intellectual property protection is the only socially responsible thing to do.  
Evidence has accumulated during the last fifty years leaving little doubt about the 
damaging effects of current intellectual property laws. At the same time, legal, 
economic, and business know-how has also accumulated about how markets for 
                                                 
6 We cannot help but pointing out here that the same symposium contains also Boldrin and Levine [2009], 
where we present a simple theoretical model of competitive invention, which is consistent with our version 
of a marshallian model of a competitive and innovative industry and capable of solving the puzzle. 
Contrary to the standard model, in our strengthening patent’s protection leads to fewer, faster and smaller 
inventions and to a reduction of the aggregate inventive effort, which is exactly what the micro and macro 
data studied, among other, by Lerner, repeatedly and systematically show.   14
innovation operates without intellectual monopoly. To rule out abolition a priori 
would be no more sensible now than it would have been to rule out the abolition of 
tariffs and trade barriers fifty years ago, when the trade liberalization process that 
has given us prosperity and globalization began. For a long time, the individuals and 
firms that profited from trade barriers argued that these increased the wealth of the 
nation, defended homeland companies and jobs, and that abolishing them would lead 
to a disaster for many sectors of our economy. It took a while to realize this was not 
true, and that trade barriers were nothing more than rent-seeking devices, favoring a 
minority and dramatically hurting the overall economy and everyone else, beginning 
with low income consumers. The same is now true of patents and copyright.  
Which leads us to address, albeit very briefly, a concern raised by a number of 
intelligent critics of our position: that we grossly overstate the positive impact 
competition may have had, or would have, on innovative activity. Again, this may 
well be true, but there is no empirical evidence whatsoever in the literature that this is 
the case. In our book we provide dozens of examples of competitive industries that are 
highly innovative and that are so because they are open to free entry and 
competition. The list goes from the very important ones – i.e. software, for a long time 
and still now in the ever expanding OSS segment,  the financial industry, the whole of 
agriculture until the 1970s, the chemical and pharmaceutical industry until WWII - 
to the somewhat secondary or even marginal - the fashion and pornography 
industries, for example - or, for that matter, the most dynamic industry of the 1990s: 
retail distribution7. In their discussion of competitive innovation, supporters of 
intellectual property have always avoided discussing such examples choosing to focus, 
instead, on the fringe cases such as academic research where the claim that other 
types of incentive mechanisms (revealing to be first and claiming priority, group 
recognition, and so on) are certainly in place. Foray’s contribution to this volume 
makes no exception to this disappointing habit. He spends most of the article 
discussing those he considers as fringe cases, trying to convince himself and the reader 
that what happens in the OSS or in the fashion business is somewhat special, instead 
of asking: why has the financial industry been so innovative for a century or more 
without the use of any intellectual property? How about the agricultural sector?  
Even when discussing the allegedly fringe cases, such as the fashion and design 
industry, Foray seems to be missing the mark almost completely. So, let us consider 
for a moment the argument according to which what drives the continuous 
innovation in the fashion and design businesses is a very unique property of their 
goods, which he labels as “positional” and lead to the assertion that “I can let you 
copy me because I have already moved on to something else”. This may well be the 
case with the very high end of the fashion business – even if Gucci or Dior would 
certainly not mind to be able to produce and sell a few hundreds of thousands more of 
their new shoes or bags, before being copied by dozens of imitators around the globe 
                                                 
7 Both Wal-Mart and Target, to name the two most successful firms, have an extremely limited number of 
patents, which are moreover rather secondary as far as the sources of their productivity gains are 
concerned. In fact, if anything, Wal-Mart and Target have frequently found themselves victims of 
submarine patents attacks, as in the famous RFID World case of 2006 against both Wal-Mart and Target!   15
selling something similar at 1/20 or 1/30 of their price – but it certainly is not the case 
with the less trendy houses that make up the bulk of the fashion and clothing 
business. When Zara copies the new jacket by Loewe maybe Loewe’s designers have 
already moved on to some new products. But when it does the same, just to stick to 
Spain, with Roberto Verino or Adolfo Dominguez (two designers that aim at the 
middle portion of the market and whose collections do not change substantially from 
one season to the next) then it hurts their bottom line and it does so dramatically 
because a good fraction of the people who would be purchasing from Dominguez or 
Verino are also purchasing from Zara, while this is seldom the case for Loewe’s 
selected clientele. Further, while a Dior bag can be easily spotted and it is hardly 
confused with its cheaper imitations, this is unlikely to be the case for a Dominguez 
jacket, hence the argument Foray advances to explain the lack of patents in this 
industry does not really apply to about 90% of the value added producing firms in 
this sector.  
But this mistake in his analysis, while destructive in the specific case, is the 
least important from a general theoretical perspective. He may have got wrong the 
specifics of the fashion and design businesses purely because he does not know those 
industries well enough, still his general argument may be correct. In other words, it 
could still be true that those characteristics he identifies as specific of the high-end 
fashion business are exclusive to it and cannot be replicated in other, bigger and more 
important, sectors. A little reflection, though, shows that this is not the case and that, 
indeed, Foray’s argument can easily be adapted to prove the opposite of what he likes 
to argue. Consider, for example, the music and movie businesses. Both follow fashion 
cycles that are determined and managed in ways not different from those of the 
clothing business. Both are characterized by super stars, stars, so-so stars, run-of-the-
mill artists and so on. Both produce goods that have a very short economic life and 
are essentially voided of market value between six months to a year after their first 
release. In the case of popular music, in fact, one could easily repeat, almost verbatim, 
Foray’s analysis of the market for high-end fashion goods and everything would go 
through smoothly. What would be the only difference? That, in this case, the good to 
be sold, from which lots of value added could be generated before it gets widely 
imitated, is not the CD or the recorded music per se - with modern technology and 
absent copyright these would probably be selling at near marginal cost after a couple 
of weeks, even if this would certainly not have been the case 10 years ago - but the 
live performances by the artists. As anyone familiar with the music business knows, 
revenues from live performances have been increasing dramatically during the last 
decade (as we predicted, on the basis of our theory of innovation, at the times of 
“Why Napster is right”) and in many countries they now equal, as a share of total 
revenue, sales of recorded music. New lyrics may be copied and concerts imitated 
within a few months from when they are first released. But attending the latter and 
consuming the first version of the former is fashionable and worth a lot in the 
meanwhile, yielding substantial revenues to the innovators exactly like in the fashion 
business. After which, because imitators have come around, the creative artist has to 
move on to something new - the new lyrics and the new concert for the following 
year’s tour - exactly like in the fashion business once again!    16
The argument can be easily adapted to the case of movies and movie stars 
(yes, indeed, they may have to earn a living by acting live on stage sometimes, those 
among them that can at least … but then, have you ever wondered what the 
opportunity cost is for a Hollywood Strip bartender to leave his/her job and become a 
theatre actor?) and of book writers (ask yourself: how many million dollars does the 
average good writer need to bear the burden of becoming famous?) The relevant 
analytical point that Foray misses is that impatience for consuming the new goods 
(whatever its reasons may be: social status, curiosity, boredom, rapidly decreasing 
marginal utility of the previous items, etcetera) is a common characteristics of all 
goods whose market value is determined by some “social fashion” cycle, hence of all 
the copyrighted goods, among other, and not just of fashion design! Said it otherwise: 
when applied with a bit of creativity and imagination - of which competitive 
entrepreneurs are certainly not as scarcely endowed as academics are – Foray’s 
argument leads straightaway to the conclusion that copyright protection could be 
reduced to, say, one year, without affecting anything but the socially irrelevant riches 
of a few movie and music superstars! Strangely enough, Foray - like many other 
practitioners of the old and counter-factual “Schumpeterian” theories - fails to see 
this simple analogy and does not carry his otherwise nicely designed argument to its 
logical end. Which is: we can do well without copyright because the copyright-
protected sectors produce mostly positional goods, out of which substantial rents can 
be extracted through the sale of complementary goods, and for which innovation is a 
must even under competition.  
A very similar argument could be developed for the case of Opens Source 
Software and other “communitarian” mechanisms of innovation sharing. Contrary to 
what analysts like Foray and other claim, these sectors do not rely on special norms of 
mutual interaction other than competition and profit seeking, plus the prohibition of 
claiming intellectual property over the products circulating within the sector. The 
“open knowledge regime”, in the case of OSS, is not some particular institution 
supporting a special social norm but, rather, a kind of “local anti-trust” rule allowing 
competition to play its course, and nothing else. Programmers and firms operating 
within the OSS framework are profit maximizers, like everyone else, receiving their 
compensation mostly in a monetary form: salaries, profits, consulting fees, and so on. 
What makes the OSS sector thrives is that, because monopoly power is forbidden, 
participants are forced to innovate and the market value of the innovations is high 
enough that the competitive rents accruing to the innovator while her innovations are 
copied and replicated are large enough to cover for her opportunity costs of producing 
them. The rents come partly from the sale of the original copies of the innovation 
itself and partly from the sale of a complementary good (the programmer’s expertise) 
which would not exist absent the innovation. That is, if one thinks of it, not so 
different from the way in which the financial consultancy and the medical professions, 
just to name two macroscopic examples, make a very good living. They both create 
new products and services that are frequently copied almost freely by competitors 
after a few initial copies have been sold at a relatively high price. But, while their 
innovations spread around by way of imitation, the financial consultant that first 
developed the new and successful product or portfolio rule and the medical doctor   17
that came up with a new diagnostic technique or a new method to cure a disease, keep 
earning substantial rents for many years by selling their expertise (i.e. the innovation 
embodied in their human capital) to concerned clients and potential imitators 
likewise. Again, what in the eyes of the believer in the “Schumpeterian” model 
appears as a fringe and un-repeatable circumstance is revealed as nothing else but 
competition at works in one of its many real-world implementations. 
Fact is: all the available evidence says that competitive markets innovate 
abundantly and new statistical evidence (e.g. Bessen and Hunt [2003] for the software 
industry, Correa [2010] for a large sample of sectors) is finally8 also starting to show 
that the rate of growth of productivity may in fact be decreasing, across industries 
and over time, as the degree of monopoly power, especially intellectual monopoly, 
increases.  Our critics, therefore, may well be right when asserting that we are wrong, 
but the burden of the proof is on their shoulders. It is up to them to prove, through 
data and facts, that our examples are either distorted or irrelevant or special. Until 
that is done we can only remind the reader that, for various centuries, the very same 
negative and dismissive evaluation of the power of competition had been opposed to 
advocates of free trade. The history of the last century and a half is there to prove 
who was right and who was wrong in that particular debate9. 
Therefore, while waiting for an empirical proof that competition harms 
innovation, let us move on to the issue that is most controversial: is it worth 
advocating the abolition of patents and copyright? Scientific studies of the current 
system agree that it is badly broken. Getting rid of it may therefore be a good idea. 
Still, one should pause. Realizing that intellectual monopoly may be akin to cancer, 
we recognize that simply cutting it all out at once poses problems. Since intellectual 
property laws have been around for a long while, we have learned to live with them. A 
myriad of other legal and informal institutions, business practices and professional 
skills have grown up around them and in symbiosis with them. Consequently, a 
sudden elimination of intellectual property laws may bring about collateral damages 
of an intolerable magnitude. What this argument suggests is that abolition must be 
approached by smaller steps, and that the sequencing of steps matters. Gradual 
reform is necessary both because of the need for other institutions, to reform in 
parallel, and also because it is a political necessity. The number of people prospering 
thanks to intellectual monopoly is large and growing. While some of them, such as 
movie stars, have accrued much wealth, for many others this is not the case. For 
many ordinary people intellectual monopoly has become another way of earning a 
living and, while most of them would be able to earn an equally good or even better 
living without it, many others need time to adjust. Further, and again in analogy 
                                                 
8 The word “finally” should be qualified. George Stigler, in Stigler [1956], first provided evidence that this 
was indeed the case. The dominance of the “Schumpeterian” model, since then, has been so strong that 
pretty much no serious research had asked this question in a proper analytical and statistical format for 
more than 50 years. That competition could not generate innovation was a dogma nobody ever bothered to 
question. 
9 The reader may want to note that, theoretically, there are circumstances under which trade is detrimental 
to allocational efficiency and growth. Interestingly enough these are roughly the same circumstances under 
which competition is detrimental to innovation …   18
with trade barriers, while the number of people who would benefit from the 
elimination of intellectual monopoly is large and growing, the gain each one of them 
perceives as likely is small. In spite of the brouhaha surrounding the “pirating” of 
popular music and movies, the direct personal saving from copyright reduction or 
even abolition would not be substantial as music, movies and books are a tiny share of 
household consumption. In the case of medicines and software, consumers’ potential 
saving may be more substantial but harder to perceive. Finally, and most 
importantly, if in the 1950s or 1960s the average citizen of the world could hardly 
forecast the tremendous improvement in her standard of living that free trade would 
have brought about within thirty years, even harder it is now to perceive the 
incremental technological advances that a progressive elimination of intellectual 
monopoly could bring about in a couple of decades.  
In summary, dismantling our intellectual property system requires facing a set 
of challenges that the literature on collective action has identified long ago as major 
barriers to reform. A few, well-organized and coordinated monopolists, on the one 
side, are bound to lose a lot if the protective barriers are lifted. A very large number of 
uncoordinated consumers, on the other side, would receive very small personal gains 
from the adoption of freer competition. For a long time then, the battleground is 
going to be one of competing ideas and theories aimed at convincing public opinion 
that substantial gains are possible from the elimination of intellectual monopoly. 
That is why, albeit reluctantly, we have chosen to conclude this brief summary of our 
position with a critical discussion of some of the criticisms a particularly distinguished 
defender of intellectual property has levied against our book.  
6. Confused criticisms 
 
Scherer [2009] contains a very negative review of our book, which (for a 
variety of rather obvious reasons) we had chosen to ignore until it turned out that, 
possibly for the prestige associated to the name of Scherer in the field of industrial 
organization, it was being widely used to dismiss our position outright without ever 
addressing the substantive issues it raises. Last, but not the least, this is what 
Dominique Foray does in his contribution to this volume where, after a summary 
description of one of our models, he writes 
 
“Much could of course be said about the approach of Boldrin and Levine, especially their carelessness and 
lack of interest concerning empirical data (see the very severe criticism of Scherer (2009) in this 
connection). For instance, applied microeconomists strongly disagree that there is no evidence as to 
unpriced spillovers ; the whole geographically mediated patent citation literature has built an extensive 
base of evidence regarding the existence of these spillovers. The theoretical argument of Boldrin and 
Levine is therefore correct but under conditions (absence of unpriced spillovers) that make it a special case 
where the intellectual asset is endowed with a property of natural excludability (particularly linked with its 
strong tacit dimension, Foray, 2009).” 
 
There are three propositions here and they are all three embarrassingly 
incorrect. Let us start from the last one. The assumption of complete, or natural, 
excludability is irrelevant to the argument developed in our paper “Perfectly   19
Competitive Innovation” (Boldrin and Levine [2008], see also Boldrin and Levine 
[2004b, 2005a]) as one can quickly figure out by simply reading it, as it contains a 
discussion of the case in which positive external effects are present. Again, the issue 
here is one of (net discounted value of) appropriated rents versus opportunity cost of 
innovation. The presence of un-priced external effects makes a difference only insofar 
as it implies a below optimal effort (about which, in a line or two) but it does not 
imply that the competitive rents accruing to the innovator would not be enough to 
give her the incentive to innovate! Real externalities, obviously, implies a socially 
suboptimal effort but, equally obviously, their presence suggest that either a tax or a 
subsidy or a prize should be the appropriate public intervention, not the concession of 
a legal monopoly! Moral: as far as economic theory is concerned, the presence or 
absence of externalities is completely orthogonal to the debate about intellectual 
property. 
As for the actual presence of substantial un-priced externalities under 
competition, which Foray takes for granted, we can only say two things. If there were 
externalities, patents would certainly not “price” them efficiently, hence the dead-
weight loss monopoly induces would simply be added to the inefficiency due to the 
external effect. Moreover, in the very many studies we are aware of, there is no clear 
empirical evidence of the allegedly widespread external effect and, surprisingly, Foray 
himself provides no reference whatsoever to support his claim, not even one. But 
these are secondary matters, from a scientific view point. The relevant ones are other: 
to the extent imitation is the simplest and most frequent form of technological 
adoption, which it is, there are natural external effects in the real world. As a matter 
of theory, any competitive model of technological change allowing for imitation will 
automatically yield a suboptimal equilibrium when everyone imitates everyone else. 
This is not only plain and obvious, it is also well understood and the open problems 
are elsewhere. (1) Quantitatively speaking, how large are those externalities in 
relation to the overall cost of innovation/imitation and to the overall social value of 
an innovation? (2) Is the allocation that obtains at a competitive equilibrium with 
imitation better or worse, from a social view point, than the one that obtains at a 
monopolistic equilibrium of the same economy? Hic sunt leones, which we very much 
doubt applied microeconomists working in the “Schumpeterian” tradition have even 
discovered to exist, let alone face and tame. 
Finally, we come to the most painful proposition, according to which the 
review by Scherer [2009] proves how careless and without interest for empirical data 
our whole research is. The latter statement could be easily dismissed on the ground 
that about 7/10 of our book, and a number of our papers in this field, are all about 
data and historical facts. It is apparent that neither Foray nor Scherer have spent 
much time reading either the book or our papers because, had they done so, they 
would at least criticized our empirical findings showing how inconsistent they are; or 
maybe not. In any case, because Scherer’s review is invoked as the only evidence 
proving the sloppiness and lack of empirical substance of our research we have no 
alternative but face Scherer’s criticisms, one by one.  It is not going to be nice, and we 
apologize from the start.   20
Scherer’s first criticism is that we are apparently so confused to believe that 
the “great man”, as he calls his friend Joe Schumpeter, was actually called Jason and 
his great book – in the eyes of Scherer: in ours it is one of the most confusing pieces a 
social scientist ever produced, after the General Theory – was published in 1943 instead 
of 1942. He fails to mention that, in the body of our book, the great man is repeatedly 
mentioned by his full name, Joseph, and that “Jason” is clearly and editorial typo 
introduced in the index of names, together with the wrong date. Having chosen to 
start his review with this kind of remarks is a clear indicator of Scherer’s attitude, as 
are his complains because, in a bibliography that covers more than 300 titles, about 
20% of them (including all the USPO documents, the Supreme Court sentences, and 
so on) are referenced as available through the internet!  
He then claims that we misrepresent the substance of the survey by Cohen et 
al. (2000) because “It makes a huge difference to say, as Boldrin and Levine do, that only 
about one-third of respondents believed that patents were effective, instead of reporting 
accurately that on average patents were effective in appropriating benefits for 35% of the 
innovations made by respondent companies.” Too bad he fails to point out that, just 
above the lines he quotes, we explain quite clearly what the survey is about, thereby 
making obvious what the word “firms” means here. Beside, Scherer fails to explain 
where the huge difference is supposed to be in this context: in both cases it remains 
true that only in, roughly, one case out of three patents are effective in appropriating 
benefits from innovation. Carried away by the preposterous nature of his criticism, 
Scherer also add that this survey constitutes “a bulwark of their argument” (one page 
and seven lines, for two surveys in fact, in a book of 270 pages) and that “From this 
error, they go on to claim that the marginal stimulus to R&D of patents is zero” which is 
a figment of his imagination, including the italicizing of the word “marginal”, as we 
never developed such argument anywhere in the book. Interestingly, in the third 
edition of his textbook (Scherer [1990]) we read “This conclusion is supported by the 
findings from several surveys of R&D executives, revealing quite uniformly that in most 
industries, patents are not very important compared to other incentives for innovation. In 
the most recent and comprehensive effort, Levin et al. asked 650 U.S. R&D executives to 
evaluate on a scale of from 1 (“not at all effective”) to 7 (“very effective”) the 
effectiveness of alternative means of protecting the competitive advantages from new and 
improved products and processes. Averaging across 130 industries the scores on six 
questionnaire items were as follows: [table.] …” The survey Scherer quotes here, which 
we also mention in the book, is an earlier one but its aims and findings are completely 
coherent with the later one. It is interesting to note how Scherer, when not reviewing 
books by authors he does not like, uses the same sloppy language he finds so mistaken 
in other. In his textbook he goes on talking about “industries”, “R&D executives” 
and the same language is used to describe shortly after Mansfield [1986] survey to 
conclude, surprisingly, that “Thus, a world without patents quite clearly would not be a 
world without innovation. Other incentives for innovation would fill most gaps. Some 
inventions would be lost, [… small firms will need protection, etcetera].”
10  
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Things get even more interesting as Scherer decides to take up our theory, 
which he must have considered very carefully given the Mickey Mouse rendition he 
provides (“They present a naive but serviceable supply and demand model”) and which, 
surprise surprise, he had anticipated long ago. He writes, in fact: “Both arguments, 
supported by numerous anecdotes, have roots in an extensive prior literature not cited by 
Boldrin and Levine. Except for some supporting evidence, all of the essential elements 
had emerged in time for the survey in Chap. 16 of the second (1980) edition of my 
industrial organization textbook.”  Well, we went and checked it out. In the third 
edition (1990) of the same textbook - the latest available in case the interested reader 
wanted to double check - the chapter in question is numbered 17 and is nearly 
identical to Chapter 16 of the second edition. We searched long and hard in that 
chapter (and in the rest of the book, to be honest) and here is what we have found. In 
the section titled “The Logic of Patent Protection” between page 621 and page 624, 
Scherer explains his basic model, which is the very standard one and that we have 
already duly criticized before, in section 3. Here are some key excerpts: 
“Suppose, however, that there were no patent protection and no other barriers to the 
imitation of the innovator’s invention. Then a scenario like the one shown in panel (b) of 
Figure 17.1 might unfold. Soon after the new product appears, competing firms will 
introduce their imitating products, squeezing the demand schedule left for the original 
innovator to D2. With less residual demand, the innovator must derive a new marginal 
revenue function MR2 and set a new, lower price OP2, which yields profit rectangle 
P2BYM barely covering the innovator’s R&D debt service cost. However, the imitator 
firms may have had to incur little of no R&D cost on their own, “free riding” on the 
innovator’s R&D and thus, with unit costs of only OM [the same marginal cost the 
innovator faces], they will realize supra-normal profits at price OP2. More competitors 
will be drawn in by this price and profit lure, squeezing the innovator’s residual demand 
curve further to D3. The innovator must reoptimize again […] profit  […] now smaller 
than the continuing R&D debt service obligations. If this diffusion process were to unfold 
rapidly and if the innovator correctly foresaw its course, the innovator would perceive 
that its R&D costs will not be recouped and would therefore choose not to invest in the 
R&D […] Pursuing the analysis a step further, we see a kind of dilemma. If the R&D 
investment were incurred and the innovation made, imitative entry might, absent patent 
protection, continue until the price is driven all the way down to the competitive level, 
ignoring the innovator’s  front-end costs  - that is, to OM [the marginal cost, apparently 
common to both imitators and innovator, and constant, n.d.r.] [...] The technological well 
will run dry. The patent system makes a deliberate tradeoff, accepting during the patent 
grant’s life dead-weight surplus losses in order to ensure that the new products and 
processes,, along with the surpluses they create, will not be discouraged by fear of rapid 
imitation.” 
Not only this is the exact opposite of our model but also, as the reader may 
have noticed, this is a verbal rendition of the same naïve and inconsistent (but 
serviceable?) traditional model we discussed in Section 3. The one in which, if you are 
not careless and look carefully, the logical implications are the opposite of those 
Scherer wants to reach because, under his assumptions, there will never be any 
imitation in the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of his model. Never mind, let us 
continue searching. At this point we find the paragraphs, already mentioned above, in   22
which Scherer describes the results of the “Yale Survey”, which is introduced, on page 
628,  with this statement “As a result [of various factors delaying imitation, n.d.r.], the 
profit expectations associated with a prospective innovation may be sufficient to warrant 
going ahead even when no patent protection is anticipated.” Could this single statement 
be “all the essential elements” Scherer mentions in order to dispose of our “serviceable 
model”? It seems to be the case, because after illustrating the Yale Survey he moves 
on to a section titled “The Links between Market Structure and Innovation”, where 
oligopolistic competition is discussed to reach the conclusion (page 637) “We find 
therefore a clash of structural propensities, giving rise to a dualism in the links between 
market structure and incentives for innovation. Up to a point, increased fragmentation 
stimulates more rapid and intense support of R&D. […] But when the number of firms 
becomes so large that no individual firm can appropriate quasi rents sufficient to cover 
its R&D costs, innovation can be slowed or even brought to a halt.” This, most 
certainly, is not an anticipation of what we have been claiming, right or wrong that it 
may be. Further down things get even worse, but they also get clearer. In the 
subsection titled “Dynamics and Welfare Implications” (pp. 637-644), he uses a model 
by Yoram Bazel to reach the following conclusions (pp. 639-640), which clearly 
illustrate what Scherer considers to be a proper characterization of competition: 
“Barzel invokes here the classic equilibrium definition: competition is characterized by 
such free entry that expected profits (after covering fixed R&D costs) are zero. This can 
only occur at the break-even point […] Just how the competitive process evolves to 
achieve this zero profit equilibrium need not concern us in detail yet. It cannot be 
through postinnovation price competition, for a perfect patent permits monopoly pricing 
then. So the competition is at the preinnovation stage, for example, in Barzel’s original 
schema, as a single firm preempts its less bold rivals with and R&D project conducted so 
early that its costs equal discounted quasi rents.” He continues on to find that 
competition in the Barzel’s sense innovates at the optimal rate only by 
“happenstance” and, after a long and contorted discussion that relies heavily on 
externalities, Scherer concludes (pp. 642) that “Profitable oligopoly is most apt to 
sustain an innovation pace preferable to that of monopoly and competition”. The issue 
here is neither if the models Scherer uses are interesting and appropriate nor if his 
conclusions are empirically supported. The issue here is that there is no actual 
evidence, in his textbook, that the priority claim he makes in his review of our book is 
based on anything other than his own wishful thinking.  
   The rest of the review has the same “quality”, and one would be tempted to 
stop here were not because a couple of more interesting facts can be noted by moving 
forward. The bulk of Scherer’s review is dedicated, in fact, to Chapter 9 of our book, 
which aims at briefly discussing the implications of our theory for the pharmaceutical 
sector. Scherer’s discussion, here, is distinctively bipolar. On the one hand, he 
complains for our lack of attention to studies carried out various decades ago and 
characterizing a pharmaceutical sector quite different from the one we are facing 
today, while complaining for a sequence of alleged “mistakes” that he neither   23
documents nor explains but simply states as such.11 On the other, he seems to agree 
with the substance of our conclusions (he misses completely the economics behind our 
discussion of “me too drugs” and even the conclusions we reach, but we are ready to 
blame it on our obscure writing style and not on his lack of attention) but is irritated 
by the fact that we do not quote a certain book (Angell [2004]) which, admittedly, we 
discovered only after having completed ours and that, nevertheless, makes in many 
more details the very same points we actually make in our short chapter with regard 
to the drugs industry. Matter of fact, an earlier article by the same author is quoted 
and used in Chapter 9!  
One wonders, then, about the motives leading Scherer to write such a negative 
review of our book, given the absolute lack of substantive criticisms he is capable of 
raising and, at the same time, why such a pitiful collection of snotty and un-
substantiated remarks would become an excuse not to address the substance of the 
matter on the part of other researchers. While we do not have an answer for the latter 
question, we may have found one for the first: F. M. Scherer, apparently, did not 
review our book but something else. According to the title of his review he is 
concerned with a book titled “Against Intellectual Property”, while ours is titled 





For centuries, the cause of economic progress has been identified with that of 
free trade. In the decades to come, sustaining economic progress will depend, more 
and more, upon our ability to progressively reduce and eventually eliminate 
intellectual monopoly. As in the battle for free trade, the first step must consist in 
destroying the intellectual foundations of the obscurantist position. Back then the 
mercantilist fallacy taught that, to become wealthy, a country must regulate trade 
and strive for trade surpluses. Today, the same fallacy teaches that without 
intellectual monopoly innovations would be impossible and that our governments 
should prohibit parallel import and enforce draconian intellectual monopoly rules. We 
hope that we have made some progress in demolishing that myth. 
                                                 
11 Had Scherer spent an hour or two explaining what those mistakes were, and providing references to the 
correct calculations, one could attempt a reply that is instead impossible in front of statements of the type 
“you are wrong because I say so”.    24
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